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EXCLUDING HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED TESTIMONY
ON THE "HEARSAY RATIONALE"
INTRODUCTION
During the 1970's, teams of specially trained police hypnotists
formed across the country.1 These teams, called Svengali Squads,2 were
designed to aid police investigations by employing hypnosis to restore
a victim's memory3 of a crime.4 Such cases generally involve situa-
tions where the victim viewed the assailant, but because everything
happened too quickly or was so traumatic, the victim is later unable
to recall crucial facts surrounding the incident.5 Hypnosis is used in
an effort to restore these crucial facts to the victim's present memory.
Success in refreshing the memory not only facilitates the investiga-
tion of the crime,6 but enables the victim to later testify at trial.
However, whether the previously hypnotized victim's testimony is
from his factual memory of the event or from a memory unconsciously
1. Serrill, Breaking the Spell of Hypnosis, TIME, Sept. 17, 1984, at 62.
The Los Angeles police department was the first to employ the use of hypno-
investigators. The use of hypno-investigators became so popular that even the Federal
Bureau of Investigation instructed some of its agents in hypnosis. Id.
2. Id. The title of Svengali was adopted from the name of a character in
the novel TRILBY. Svengali was a hypnotist who hypnotically overpowered a helpless
female and inspired her to musical accomplishment. G. du MAURIER, TRILBY (1894).
3. This note does not differentiate between the victim and non-victim of crime
who is hypnotized and subsequently testifies. In each instance the cases similarly analyze
the admissibility question. Compare, People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d
848 (1979) (eyewitness) with Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982) (victim/witness).
4. See generally Monrose, Justice With Glazed Eyes: The Growing Use of Hyp-
notism in Law Enforcement, JURIS DOCTOR, Oct.-Nov. 1978, at 54.
5. A witness who claims to have forgotten the facts surrounding a particular
event is, in effect, claiming amnesia for that event. There are three types of amnesia
important to this note: (1) Congrade Amnesia: a complete loss of recall of the event
itself; (2) Retrograde Amnesia: a loss of recall of events preceding the incident; (3)
Anterograde Amnesia: a loss of recall of events following the incident. Milos, Hypnotic
Exploration of Amnesia After Cerebral Injuries, 23 INT'L. J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMEN-
TAL HYPNOSIS 103 (1975).
6. For example, in July of 1975, Franklin Edward Ray, a bus driver, along
with the twenty-six children in his bus, were kidnapped outside of Chowchilla, Califor-
nia. Ray was later hypnotized in an effort to recall details surrounding the event.
While under hypnosis Ray recalled five of the six digits on the license plate of the
kidnapper's van. This information proved to be a breakthrough in the investigation.
Reported in State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 686, 643 P.2d 246, 250 (N.M. Ct. App.
1981). The use of hypno-investigators has reportedly led to hundreds of convictions.
Serrill, supra note 1, at 62.
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confabulated7 while under hypnosis is not known Nevertheless, the
frequency in employing hypnosis to restore a victim's memory of a
crime has dramatically increased over the past two decades.' Conse-
quently, litigation on the admissibility of hypnotically induced
testimony has also increased.'0
State courts have assumed three different positions concerning
the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony in a criminal trial.
Some state courts admit such testimony, holding that hypnosis affects
only the witness' credibility and not the testimony's admissibility."
7. Confabulation is the filling in of memory gaps with inaccurate or fictitious
bits of information. Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4
OHIO N.U.L. REV. 1, 4 n.13 (1977).
8. See infra note 122-24 and accompanying text.
9. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospec-
tive Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313 n.3 (1980). Although specific reasons for the in-
creased popularity for the use of hypnosis cannot be isolated, one commentator sug-
gests it may be attributable in part to three books dealing with hypnosis and law
enforcement: H. ARONS, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1967); W. BYRAN, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS (1962); and M. TEITELBAUM, HYPNOSIS INDUCTION TECHINQUES (1969).
Id.
10. Through 1968 there were eight cases that decided the admissibility of hyp-
notically induced testimony. Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hyp-
nosis, 67 VA. L. REV. 1203 n.4 (1981). From 1968 through 1974, nine such cases were
decided, and from 1975 through September of 1980, twenty-two such cases were decided.
Id.
11. State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d 792 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) ("[W]e decline to
adopt a per se rule rendering the complaining witnesses in these cases incompetent
to testify at trial regarding the matters covered in their pretrial hypnotic sessions.");
Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974) ("[W]e do not agree that the
hypnotic sessions tainted the testimony and rendered it inadmissible."); People v.
Smrekar, 68 Il. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979) (when a witness is capable of giv-
ing testimony having some probative value, witness is permitted to testify with evidence
of impairment of ability of witness to accurately recall evidence, or that suggestive
material has been used to refresh witness' recollection going only to weight to be
given to testimony of witness); State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1983) (the policy
underlying the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony must be judged in light
of the totality of the truth-finding process); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La. 1983)
(issue as to hypnosis went to question of proper weight to be accorded deputy's
testimony, rather than to question of its admissibility); State v. Brown, 37 N.W.2d
138 (N.D. 1983) (witness whose memory has been previously enhanced by use of hyp-
nosis is not rendered incompetent to testify, but rather, hypnosis affects credibility
of testimony); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971) (since the witness,
who underwent pretrial hypnosis testified in open court, was subject to rigorous cross-
examination and the hypnotic procedure was fully exposed into evidence, there is no
basis for disallowing her testimony); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d
386 (1983) (the State's use of hypnosis in an effort to enhance the recollection of a
witness did not render inadmissible a subsequent identification by such witness of
defendant in a lineup or the subsequent in-court testimony of a witness regarding
the events which were the subject of hypnosis); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo.
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Federal courts generally adopt this approach." Other state courts ad-
mit hypnotically induced testimony if the hypnotic session was con-
ducted in compliance with specified procedural safeguards. 3 Still
1982) (an attack on credibility is the proper means to determine the value of hyp-
notically induced testimony).
12. Clay v. Vose, 771 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985) (the court admitted iden-
tification testimony from a previously hypnotized witness, who had given a prehyp-
nosis identification to the police and was subject to in-court cross-examination before
a carefully instructed jury who had heard testimony concerning the possible inaccuracies
of hypnotically induced testimony); United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir.
1984) (the court held that in a particular case the evidence favoring admissibility might
make the probative value of the hypnotically induced testimony outweigh its prejudicial
effect); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978) (the fact of hypnotically
induced evidence affects only the credibility of the evidence, not its admissibility);
United States v. Charles, 561 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (the court held that hyp-
notically induced testimony was inadmissible where its probative value was outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice in that the hypnotist was unavailable for examina-
tion at trial); United States v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd, 709
F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1983) (in dicta, unaffected by the reversal, the court found hyp-
nosis to affect credibility but not admissibility); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp.
252 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (the court held that the hypnotically induced testimony was not
so implausible that it could not be true; therefore, it was up to the jury, aided by
the advocacy of counsel, to determine the credibility of such testimony).
13. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (admissibility of
hypnotically induced recall testimony hinges on a case-by-case examination of the tech-
niques used to hypnotize the witness; the following safeguards are recommended to
reduce potential prejudice from admission of hypnotically induced testimony: neutral
hypnotist should be employed; session should be conducted at independent location;
only hypnotist and witness should be present; subject should be examined by hyp-
notist to elicit every possible detail that witness recalls concerning the crime; witness
should be examined by hypnotist to ascertain whether he suffers from mental or physical
disorders that might affect results; some record of session should be preserved; hyp-
notist should avoid reassuring remarks that might stimulate confabulation; court should
carefully consider whether there is independent evidence corroborative of or contradic-
tory to statements made during the trance; and jury should receive instruction warn-
ing it of potential influence hypnosis may have on witness); State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho
618, 682 P.2d 571 (1984) (in cases where hypnosis has been employed, trial court should
conduct pretrial hearing on procedures used during hypnotic session in question, then
apply a "totality of the circumstances" test and make determination whether, in view
of all the circumstances, proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable to merit admis-
sion; the following safeguards are to be examined in determining the competence of
a witness who has undergone hypnosis: the hypnotic sessions should be conducted by
a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist trained in use of hypnosis; person conducting
session should be independent from either of the parties in case; information given
to hypnotist concerning the case should be noted; before hypnosis, hypnotist should
obtain detailed description of facts from subject; sessions should be recorded so per-
manent record is available; and preferably, only hypnotist and subject should be present,
but other persons should be allowed to attend if their attendance can be shown to
be essential and steps are taken to prevent their influencing results); House v. State,
445 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 1984) (because the hypnotically refreshed memory of the victim
was susceptible of having been contaminated during the hypnotic session, her testimony
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others find it per se inadmissible. 4 Courts adopting this strict exclu-
sionary rule generally do so on the basis of the common law test of
general scientific acceptance, otherwise known as the Frye test or
was admissible only after procedural safeguards were first complied with); State v.
Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981) (requirements before party may introduce hyp-
notically refreshed testimony in a criminal trial are: psychiatrist or psychologist
experienced in use of hypnosis must conduct session; professional conducting the ses-
sion should be independent of and not regularly employed by prosecutor, investigator
or defense; any information given to hypnotist by law enforcement personnel or defense
prior to hypnotic session must be recorded, either in writing or another suitable form;
before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist should obtain from subject a detailed descrip-
tion of facts as the subject remembers them; all contacts between hypnotist and sub-
ject must be recorded; and only hypnotist and subject should be present during any
phase of the hypnotic session); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1981) (the testimony of prehypnotic recollections is admissible in the sound
discretion of the trial court, but posthypnotic recollections are admissible only if specified
procedural safeguards are followed); State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 475 N.E.2d
805 (1984) (hypnotically refreshed testimony is admissible provided there is general
compliance with certain safeguards which tend to assure that such testimony is as
trustworthy as other eyewitness testimony).
14. Prewitt v. State, 460 So. 2d 296 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (the court upheld
excluding a witness' hypnotically induced recollections on the basis of the Frye test);
State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981) (until hypnosis gains general accep-
tance in fields of medicine and psychiatry as a method by which memories are accurately
improved without undue danger of distortion, delusion or fantasy, testimony of witnesses
who have been questioned under hypnosis regarding subject of the offered testimony
should be excluded in criminal cases from time of the hypnotic session forward); Peo-
ple v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 860 (1982) (a witness who undergoes hypnosis for the purpose of restoring his
memory of an event is per se incompetent to testify at trial); People v. Quintanar,
659 P.2d 710 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (testimony of a witness who undergoes hypnosis
is per se inadmissible as to recollections from time of hypnotic session forward; however,
witness is not incompetent to testify to prehypnosis recollections that have previous-
ly been unequivocally disclosed and recorded by tape recording, videotape, or written
statement); State v. Atwood, 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 479 A.2d 258 (1984) (testimony
elicited by use of hypnotism is inadmissible, since such processes have not achieved
general acceptance in the scientific community); State v. Davis, 490 A.2d 601 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1985) (testimony of witness who underwent hypnosis to refresh her rec-
ollection was inadmissible in a criminal trial where witness had no recollection of
events in question prior to hypnosis); State v. Moreno, - Hawaii - , 709 P.2d 103
(1985) (witness who has been hypnotized may not testify as to matters or details not
recollected prior to hypnosis and brought out by the hypnotherapy sessions); Peter-
son v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. 1983) (previously hypnotized witness should not be
permitted to testify in criminal proceedings concerning subject matter adduced during
pretrial hypnotic interview); State v. Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, 701 P.2d 909 (1985), cert.
denied, - U.S. .. 106 S.Ct. 575 (1985) (events first recalled by witness after or
during subsequent hypnosis were inadmissible at trial due to problems of unreliability,
including enhanced suggestibility); Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272
(1982) (use of hypnosis to restore or refresh memory of witness was not shown to
be accepted as reliable by relevant scientific community, and thus such testimony was
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standard.'5 In short, there is little consensus among state courts regar-
ding the treatment of hypnotically induced testimony.
The disparate case law treatment of hypnotically induced
testimony should cease. 6 This note finds the per se exclusion of such
testimony appropriate. Courts not adopting this position either find
the Frye test inapplicable," or hypnotically induced testimony
inadmissible); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983) (hyp-
notized witness may testify based on what he knew before hypnosis, but the fact of
hypnosis and its likely effect on a witness are proper matters for inquiry at trial and
a careful record of witness' prehypnotic memory should be preserved); State v. Gonzales,
415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982) (hypnosis as a technique to enhance memory recall
has not received sufficient scientific recognition of reliability to allow posthypnotic
recollection of witnesses to be introduced into evidence); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764 (Minn. 1980) (previously hypnotized witness could not testify in criminal proceeding
concerning subject matter adduced at pretrial hypnotic interview); Alsbach v. Bader,
700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985) (posthypnotic testimony lacks scientific support for its reliabili-
ty and thus should not be admitted); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648
(1981) (until hypnosis gains acceptance to a point where experts in the field widely
share view that memories are accuarately improved without undue danger of distortion,
delusion or fantasy, a witness who has been previously questioned under hypnosis
may not testify in criminal proceeding concerning subject matter adduced at the pretrial
hypnotic interview); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d
255 (1983) (a victim's posthypnotic recollections are inadmissible at trial); State v. Peoples,
311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984) (witness' hypnotically refreshed testimony and
videotape recording of the hypnotic session were inadmissible); Harmon v. State, 700
P.2d 212 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (although the hypnosis does not render a witness
incompetent to testify, the witness' testimony is limited to those facts which can
demonstrably be shown to have been recalled prior to hypnosis); Commonwealth v.
Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981) (process of refreshing recollection by hyp-
nosis has not yet gained sufficient acceptance in its field as a means of accurately
restoring forgotten or repressed memory so as to permit introduction of hypnotically-
refreshed testimony); State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984) (absent
any general scientific acceptance of hypnosis as a reliable means of refreshing recollec-
tion, the dangerous possibility of prejudice should preclude the admission of hypnotically
induced testimony).
15. The common law test of general scientific acceptance originated in Frye
v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). This test is most commonly called the
Frye test. For an explanation of what the Frye test is, see infra notes 126-33 and
accompanying text. For an explanation of how the Frye test is used in determining
the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony, see infra notes 140-45 and accom-
panying text.
16. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE S 50 (3d ed. 1984) (the admissibil-
ity of hypnotically induced testimony should be accepted or rejected or conditioned
by direct rule rather than by case law).
17. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1984) (Frye test
inapplicable in determining the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony); People
v. Gibson, 117 Ill. App. 3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1368 (1983) (Frye standard is concerned
with admission of expert opinion deduced from the results of a scientific technique
and not the admissibility of eyewitness testimony).
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reliable."i However, a question currently debated concerns whether
or not the federal courts even have a Frye standard to apply, for
it has been persuasively argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence
silently abolished the Frye test.9 Therefore, for the state courts which
admit hypnotically induced testimony and for the federal courts which
find the Frye test unavailable or inapplicable, an alternative rationale
for the per se exclusion of hypnotically induced testimony is necessary.
An alternative rationale for the per se exclusion of hypnotically
induced testimony is the rationale underlying the hearsay rule.' Hear-
say is generally excluded at trial because the three ideal conditions
for a witness to testify under are not satisfied."' Ideally, a person
testifies under oath or affirmation, in the presence of the trier of fact,
and is subject to contemporaneous cross-examination."2 Although a
witness testifying from a hypnotically induced memory may literally
satisfy these testimonial requirements, the purpose underlying each
requirement remains unsatisfied.2 Therefore, testimony from a hyp-
notically induced memory should be excluded in the same manner as
hearsay. This is not to say that hypnotically induced testimony should
be excluded as hearsay, but that it should be excluded on the rationale
which excludes hearsay testimony.
First, this note will examine the scientific phenomenon of hyp-
nosis and its use as an investigative tool. Next, the three methods
employed by state courts in determining the admissibility of hyp-
notically induced testimony will be explored. This note will then ex-
amine the position taken by the federal courts, the hearsay rule, and
the purpose underlying each of the three requirements for testifying
in a non-hearsay manner. The testimonial requirements of oath or af-
firmation, personal presence, and contemporaneous cross-examination
will be discussed seriatim. After examining each requirement this note
18. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 538, 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981) (hypnotically induced
testimony is admissible in those cases where it can be shown that the hypnotically
induced memory is comparable in accuracy to normal recall).
19. S. SALTZBURG & R. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 452 (3d
ed. 1982) ("If past cases are any guide, one can only guess that the decision on whether
to apply the Frye standard will be made on a case-by-case basis, as each individual
scientific problem is posed."). C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE S 5168 (1978) (test eliminated); Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1197, 1229 (1980) (survival debatable).
20. See infra notes 168-99 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 175-99 and accompanying text.
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will submit that a person testifying from a hypnotically induced
memory fails to satisfy the purpose underlying each requirement, and
therefore, hypnotically induced testimony should be excluded at trial
on the same rationale as hearsay. Consequently, all courts which do
not currently exclude hypnotically induced testimony should consider
excluding such on a rationale analogous to the hearsay rationale.
I. HYPNOSIS: WHAT IS IT?
Although practiced for centuries,24 it is still unclear what hyp-
nosis is.2" As a result, numerous definitions" and hypotheses27 con-
24. See Diamond, supra note 9, at 317; Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, 11
YALE L.J. 173, 174 (1902). For a concise summary of the history of hypnosis, its use
and practice, see 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 133-40 (15th ed. 1974).
25. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 1984) (after review-
ing the current legal and scientific literature on hypnosis, the court concluded that the
exact nature of the hypnotic state was not understood).
26. The American Medical Association defines hypnosis as:
[A] temporary condition of altered attention in the subject which
may be induced by another person and in which a variety of phenomena
may appear spontaneously or in response to verbal or other stimuli. These
phenomena include alterations in consciousness and memory, increased
susceptibility to suggestion, and the production in the subject of responses
and ideas unfamiliar to him in his usual state of mind.
Note, A Survey of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony in Criminal Trials: Why Such
Evidence Should be Admitted in Iowa, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 749, 750 (1982-83). Black's Law
Dictionary defines hypnotism as "the act of inducing artifically a state of sleep or
trance in a subject by means of verbal suggestion by the hypnotist or by the subject's
concentration upon some subject. It is generally characterized by extreme respon-
siveness to suggestions from the hypnotist." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 668 (5th ed.
1979); Webster's Dictionary defines hypnosis as "a state which resembles sleep but
is induced by a person whose suggestions are readily accepted by the subject."
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 593 (1983).
27. There are numerous schools of thought on the phenomenon of hypnosis,
and each school adopts its own model of explanation:
[Tihere are the hereditary models which conceive of hypnosis as an in-
herited characteristic that reflects a phylogenetic and regressive group
of qualities and traits .... There is a physiological model which conceives
of hypnosis as a product of . . . the brain, such as areas of inhibition
and areas of excitation, or the action of the reticular activating system.
There is an internal environmental model which deals with the exchanges
and interchanges of biochemical substances in the neural system throughout
the brain. There is a learning model that conceives of hypnosis as a form
of learning, like conditioning. There is a cultural social model which explains
hypnosis in terms of contagious suggestibility and role-playing. There is
developmental motivational model which deals with various interper-
sonal and intrapsychic dimensions, such as dissociation and ontogenetic
regression to earlier modes of thinking, feeling, and behavior, involving
an anachronistic revival of the child-parent relationship and related
transference phenomena.
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cerning hypnosis have arisen. This confusion is partly due to the fact
that hypnosis is a scientific phenomenon which lacks definitional preci-
sion." The fact that the focal point of hypnosis is the inherently am-
biguous human mind exacerbates the confusion.'
Although science fails in fully understanding hypnosis, the follow-
ing hypnotic characteristics have been observed in hypnotized sub-
jects highly susceptible to hypnosis: subsidence of the planning func-
tion,' redistribution of attention," availability of visual memories from
the past, and heightened ability for fantasy production,32 reduction
in reality testing and a tolerance for persistent reality distortion,'
increased suggestibility,' role behavior," and amnesia for what
transpired while in the hypnotic state.' All in all, more is known about
the characteristics of a person under hypnosis than is known about
the phenomenon itself. Nevertheless, this has not detered the legal
world from employing hypnosis as a means of refreshing a victim's
memory of a crime.
The use of hypnosis as a means of refreshing a victim's memory
of a crime is based on the "exact copy" theory of memory. This theory
M. KLINE & L. WOLBERG, THE NATURE OF HYPNOSIS: CONTEMPORARY THEORETICAL
APPROACHES 6 (1962).
28. Note, supra note 26, at 750.
29. London, Ethics in Hypnosis, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNOSIS 593-94 (J. Gordon ed. 1967). One conclusion which can be drawn from the
plethora of definitions and explanations surrounding hypnosis is that no single, satisfac-
tory explanation of it has yet to emerge. See Note, supra note 10, at 1208.
30. A hypnotized subject loses the initiative and desire to make and follow
through on plans of his own. Diamond, supra note 9, at 316 (reporting from E. HILGARD,
THE EXPERIENCE OF HYPNOSIS 6-10 (1968)).
31. Hypnosis causes increased selective attention and selective inattention. Id.
32. A hypnotized subject can vividly visualize past events in his mind.
Moreover, the hypnotist can suggest the reality of memories for events that did not
happen. Id.
33. While in a hypnotic state, any type of reality distortion, including falsified
memories, may be accepted without hesitation by the hypnotized subject. Id.
34. The theory that hypnosis is mainly a suggestion and acceptance process
is so widely embraced that writers on hypnosis equate one with the other. Id.
35. The suggestions that a hypnotized subject will accept are not limited to
specific acts or perceptions. If suggested, he will adopt a suggested role and carry
on complex activities corresponding to that role. Id.
36. Although not a necessary aspect of hypnosis, amnesia for what occurred
while under hypnosis is very common and may be furthered through suggestion of
such by the hypnotist. Id.
37. See W. BRYAN, JR., LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS 202-10 (1962); D. CHEEK
& L. LECRON, CLINICAL HYPNOTHERAPY 54 (1968). But cf. Beaver, Memory Restored or
Confabulated by Hypnosis-Is It Competent?, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 155, 161-63
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posits that all information received by the body senses is stored in
the brain complete and unaltered." Consequently, an inability to
remember is merely an inability to retrieve previously stored infor-
mation. 9 Under this theory hypnosis operates as a means by which
difficulties in retrieving stored information are overcome. 0 The
primary hypnotic phenomenons operating to overcome memory recall
difficulties are age regression, the posthypnotic suggestion and
hypermnesia."
The hypnotic phenomenon of age regression is central in retriev-
ing information stored in a person's mind. Age regression occurs when
the hypnotist instructs the hypnotized subject to concentrate upon
a past event in the subject's life.42 If successful, the subject will
visualize and relive the suggested event in his mind.4" While reliving
the event, the subject may articulate what he remembers happened.44
By itself, age regression is insufficient in restoring a victim's memory
of a crime; therefore, it is generally used in conjunction with the
posthypnotic suggestion.
A posthypnotic suggestion is a request or order to an individual
(1982-83) (a general discussion of the history of the "exact copy" theory of memory,
and how some studies refute it); Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27
INT'L J. OF CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 321 (1979) (the author found
the "exact copy" theory of memory unsupported by any scientific data).
38. D. CHEEK & L. LECRON, supra note 37 at 54.
39. Id.
40. Id.
The idea that one can in hypnosis somehow reactivate original memory
traces stems from a widely held view . . that memory involves a process
analogous to a multi-channel videotape-recorder inside the head which
records all sensory impressions and stores them in their pristine form.
Further, there is a belief that while this material cannot ordinarily be
brought to consciousness, it can be accessed through hypnosis ...
Id.
41. Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of
Evidence Susceptible, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 572 (1977).
42. Id. at 574. For a concise, scientific discussion on the phenomenon of age
regression, see L. WOLBERG, HYPNOSIS: IS IT FOR You? 98-103 (2d ed. 1982).
43. Spector & Foster, supra note 41, at 574. A person under hypnosis may
enter six different levels of depths of trance. Id. at 571. The first level is the lightest
trance and the sixth level is the deepest. Id. A subject who undergoes partial age
regression is in a light trance and will maintain an objective viewpoint when reliving
the event in his mind. Id. at 574. A subject who undergoes complete age regression
is in a deep trance and will relive the event both psychologically and sensually. Id.
44. Id. at 574.
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under hypnosis to perform some act45 or remember4" something after
termination of the hypnotic trance. Where a witness suffers amnesia47
concerning a crime, the hypnotist will suggest to the subject that upon
awakening he will remember the details of the event recalled while
hypnotized. 8 This technique assumes the phenomenon of age regression
was successful and that the subject was able to recall the desired
event. However, a posthypnotic suggestion does not guarantee memory
of the desired event upon awakening.49 Although age regression and
the posthypnotic suggestion used together may allow the victim of
a crime to later recall the crime, if the hypnotized subject failed to
experience hypermnesia there would be no memory retrieval at all.
Where a person under hypnosis has an exceptionally complete
memory of the past' the experience is called hypermnesia.5" A person
45. The following is an example of a non-legal, posthypnotic suggestion to
a subject for performing an act after awakening from hypnosis: A young woman under
hypnosis was told that she would, upon awakening, remove a shoe and place it on
top of a table adjacent to a vase of flowers. After awakening from the hypnosis and
subsequently performing the suggested act, the woman explained that she had recently
purchased a shoe-shaped vase, and had intended to experiment with flower arrangements
for it. Spector & Foster, supra note 41, at 573 n.28 (reporting from CHEEK & LECRON,
supra note 37 at 47-8 (1968)). For a concise, scientific explanation of the past hypnotic
suggestion, see L. WOLBERG, supra note 42, at 103-11.
46. This note focuses on the posthypnotic suggestion to a subject to remember
what has been recalled while under hypnosis. See Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230,
242, 246 A.2d 302, 309 (hypnotist testified that he instructed the hypnotized witness
that when she awakened, she would remember what she had been able to recall while
hypnotized); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Minn. 1980) (hypnotist instructed the
hypnotized witness that upon awakening she would remember very clearly everything
recalled while under hypnosis).
47. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
48. Comment, Hypnosis-Its Role and Current Admissibility in the Criminal
Law, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 665, 668-69 (1980-81).
49. Spector & Foster, supra note 41, at 573-74. If the subject upon awakening
from hypnosis remembers the desired event, the source of this new memory is nor-
mally forgotten. Cooper, Spontaneous and Suggested Posthypnotic Source Amnesia, 14
INT'L J. OF CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 180, 185 (1966). A subject upon
awakening from hypnosis may remember the contents of his new memory but forget
its source, e.g., forget that he acquired it during hypnosis. This phenomenon known
as posthypnotic source amnesia may arise spontaneously from the subject's expecta-
tions as to the nature and effects of hypnosis, or it may be unknowingly suggested
by the hypnotist when instructing the subject that upon awakening from the trance
he will clearly recall the event remembered while hypnotized. Id.
50. R. RHODES, HYPNOSIS: THEORY, PRACTICE AND APPLICATION 27-36 (1950).
51. Id. Hypermnesia is premised on the scientific hypotheses that all events
and experiences are stored in the memory wholly and in detail. Spector & Foster,
supra note 41, at 574. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. Sigmund Freud
recognized the usefulness of hypnosis to induce hypermnesia: "Hypnotism had been
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hypnotized may experience hypermnesia upon suggestion by the hyp-
notist., With a hypnotized subject's entire memory available, the specific
event desired may be brought to the forefront of the person's sub-
conscious memory through age regression, and subsequently restored
to the subject's conscious, waking memory by the posthypnotic sugges-
tion. The use of these hypnotic techniques on individuals who later
testify at trial concerning events recalled while under hypnosis has
met with varying results from the state courts.
II. THE DIFFERING JUDICIAL POSTURES CONCERNING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED TESTIMONY
Courts are unable to agree on the admissibility of testimony from
a witness who testifies from a hypnotically induced memory. The first
state courts to rule on the issue found such testimony admissible, with
the fact of hypnosis going only to the witness' credibility. Courts later
confronted with the issue responded differently. Some held the testimony
admissible only if rigorous safeguards were followed before, during,
and after the use of hypnosis, while still others held the testimony
per se inadmissible on the basis of the Frye test. The federal courts
followed the lead of the first group of state courts by holding such
testimony admissible, with the fact of hypnosis going only to the witness'
credibility. In effect, the state courts have come full circle since first
finding hypnotically induced testimony directly admissible in the land-
mark case of Harding v. State.'
In Harding, the victim of an assault and rape was unable to recall
crucial facts surrounding the incident.' Following three non-hypnotic
interviews with the police, the victim was unable to identify her at-
tacker.55 The victim was then hypnotized in an effort to refresh her
memory.5 After hypnosis the victim remembered and subsequently
identified the defendant as her attacker.5 ' At trial the victim testified
of immense help in the cathartic treatment, by widening the field of the patient's
consciousness and putting within his reach knowledge which he did not possess in
his waking life." S. FREUD, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 50 (1935).
52. See R. RHODES, supra note 50, at 28.
53. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969). The
Harding case was subsequently overruled in State v. Collins, 296 Md. App. 670, 464
A.2d 1029 (1983).
54. Id. at 232-33, 246 A.2d at 304.
55. Id. at 233-34, 246 A.2d at 305.
56. Id. at 234, 246 A.2d at 305. The victim was hypnotized at police head-
quarters by Ralph P. Oroplo, Chief Clinical Psychologist at Clifton T. Perkins State
Hospital. Id.
57. Id. at 235, 246 A.2d at 305.
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not only to this, but to the fact that her testimony came from her
present memory of the attack.' In support of the victim's testimony,
the individual who had hypnotized her testified that hypnosis produced
generally reliable recall and was not suggestive. 9 Holding that hypnosis
may affect the credibility of a witness' testimony, but not its admissi-
bility, the Harding court admitted the hypnotically induced testimony.'
In effect, the holding in Harding legitimized the use of hypnosis as
a means of refreshing a witness' memory."
A distinct advantage of the Harding approach is that it allows
a jury to hear all testimony which may have a bearing on the case.2
Moreover, such testimony may prove to be critical,' as in Harding,
where the victim's hypnotically induced testimony was the cornerstone
of the prosecution's case.' Under this rationale traditional legal devices
enable the jury to evaluate the credibility of a witness who has
undergone hypnosis.65 Such devices include cross-examination of the
witness,66 expert testimony concerning the risks and limitations of hyp-
58. Id. at 235, 246 A.2d at 305.
59. Id. at 239-40, 246 A.2d at 308. The hypnotist, a certified psychologist, was
allowed to testify as an expert after the court determined he satisfied the standard
to testify as an expert. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
60. Id.
61. The court determined that the evidence was a present recollection from
the witness' own statements to that effect. Id. Judge Learned Hand in United States
v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 806 (1947), noted that a
song, a scent, a photograph, an allusion known to be false, or anything else may be
used to refresh a witness' memory. Id. at 967. Courts generally agree that a witness'
memory of an event may be refreshed by any means. See Beaver, supra note 37, at 155.
62. The Harding approach is in keeping with the trend of opening the cour-
troom doors to all relevant evidence for jury assessment. Dilloff, supra note 7, at 10.
63. Note, supra note 10, at 1221 (findings indicate that a rule of absolute ex-
clusion would deprive the trier of fact of valuable evidence).
64. Apart from the testimony of the victim, the only other evidence offered
against the defendant was (1) that sperm had been recovered from the victim's vagina,
(2) the defendant was one of two males shown to have known where the victim could
have been found when the crime was committed, and (3) that the accused had been
observed near the vicinity of the crime on the night in question. Harding, at 247, 246
A.2d at 312.
65. Ruffra, Hypnotically Induced Testimony: Should It Be Admitted?, 19 CRIM.
L. BULL. 293, 298-99 (1983).
66. State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. 1983) (courts have presumed that
skillful cross-examination will enable the jury to evaluate the effect of hypnosis on
the credibility of the witness); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9, 492 P.2d 312, 315
(1971) (cross-examination will reveal the credibility of a witness previously hypnotized).
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nosis,67 and special jury instructions. 8 By finding hypnotically induc-
ed testimony admissible, the Harding court demonstrated its belief
that the jury would be the best arbiter of the credibility of such
testimony.
While the Harding approach allows a jury to hear all relevant
testimony, the approach is functionally limited due to the unreliability
of a hypnotically induced memory.69 There are three problems inherent
in hypnosis which work to reduce a hypnotically induced memory's
factual accuracy. The first is the hypnotized subject's high suscep-
tibility to suggestion." A hypnotized person automatically surrenders
all independent thought and critical judgment to the hypnotist." Con-
sequently, the hypnotized subject's sense of awareness innately
heightens." During this state of heightened awareness, the subject
becomes highly susceptible to verbal cues unknowingly present in the
hypnotist's speech." As a result of this undetectable verbal prompting,
67. State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 573, 329 N.W.2d 386, 395 (1983) (if
the defendant is allowed to introduce testimony of a previously hypnotized witness,
both sides should be allowed to introduce expert testimony concerning the effects of
hypnosis on memory).
68. The trial judge in Harding gave the following precautionary jury
instructions:
You have heard, during this trial, that a portion of the testimony of the
prosecuting witness ... was recalled by her as a result of her being placed
under hypnosis. The phenomenon commonly known as hypnosis has been
explained to you during this trial. I advise you to weigh'this testimony
carefully. Do not place any greater weight on this portion of... testimony
than on any other testimony that you have heard during this trial.
Remember, you are the judges of the weight and the believability of all
of the evidence in this case.
Harding, at 244, 246 A.2d at 310.
69. See generally Beaver, supra note 37, at 163-67. For an explanation of why
hypnosis produces unreliable memory, see infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
70. Diamond, supra note 9, at 333 (almost by definition, hypnosis is a state
of increased suggestibility). The enormous influence on a subject's suggestibility is
considered by many to be the most outstanding feature of hypnosis. L. WOLBERG,
supra note 42, at 81. "In hypnosis, as a consequence of submitting to the authoritative
intoning of the hypnotist, the subject tends to revert to a childlike submissiveness and
heightened suggestibility." Id. at 82. Susceptibility to suggestion becomes so strong
for a hypnotized subject, that the subject enters a state of "hypersuggestibility." Id.
at 81.
71. See supra note 70.
72. Id.
73. Diamond, supra note 9, at 333. Not only is the hypnotized subject suscep-
tible to verbal cues from the hypnotist, the expectations, demeanor, attitude and body
language of the hypnotist may all communicate suggestive messages to the subject. Id.
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the hypnotized subject may assimilate these cues into his own memory
as being factual occurrences.74 For example, a hypnotist asking a hyp-
notized witness of a robbery who is unable to remember if he saw
two, three, or four robbers, may unintentionally and unknowingly cue
the witness that there were two robbers by lowering his voice when
he says "two." The voice intonation, coupled with the hypnotized
witness' lack of critical judgment, may cue the subject into correctly
remembering there being two robbers. However, if the hypnotist had
lowered his voice on "three" instead of "two," the witness could have
easily and incorrectly recalled there being three robbers instead of
two. Therefore, a hypnotized subject's heightened sense of awareness
and high susceptibility to verbal cues may result in a subject's posthyp-
notic memory not being his own.
The verbal cues problem is compounded by two other problems
inherent in hypnosis: the hypnotized subject's need to answer the hyp-
notist's questions in a manner perceived by the subject as expected
by the hypnotist, and the hypnotized subject's ability to unknowingly
fill in memory gaps with inaccurate or fictitious bits of information,
a process otherwise known as confabulation. A subject under hypnosis
experiences a compelling desire to please the hypnotist." This state
of hypercompliance results in the hypnotized subject answering ques-
tions in a manner perceived by the subject as expected by the hyp-
notist.77 If the hypnotized subject lacks memory of an event on which
he is being questioned, or the subject fails to distinguish a verbal
cue for a preferred answer, the subject's compulsion for positive com-
pliance will make him unwilling to admit "I don't know." 8 Hence, in-
74. After awakening from hypnosis, a subject is unable to distinguish his own
thoughts, feelings, and memories from those implanted by the hypnotic experience,
i.e. cues picked up from the hypnotist. Id.
75. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
76. Hypercompliance results from the fact that a subject under hypnosis is
often eager to succeed in being hypnotized and, more important, to please the hyp-
notist. Diamond, supra note 9, at 337. Note, Safeguards Against Suggestiveness: A Means
for Admissibility of Hypno-Induced Testimony, 38 WASH. & LEE L.R. 197, 200 (1981)
(the subject's increased compliance stems from the feelings of a close relationship pro-
moted by the hypnotist to insure cooperation). The motivation or drive to answer ques-
tions and "please" the hypnotist is perhaps more pronounced in the criminal trial or
investigative setting because of two factors. First, most people want to help solve
crimes. Second, if the hypnotized witness is also the victim, the motivation to answer
is even more compelling. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
77. See Orne, supra note 37, at 326 (a hypnotized subject will often incor-
porate into his responses his notion of what is expected of him). Due to the hypnotiz-
ed subject's need to relay answers perceived as pleasing to the hypnotist, one com-
mentator has referred to a hypnotized subject as engaging in a "guessing strategy."
Id. at 326.
78. Id.
[Vol. 20
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stead of admitting that he fails to know an answer to a question, the
subject will unknowingly confabulate one.'9 Stated another way, a hyp-
notized subject's desire to answer questions in a manner perceived
as pleasing to the hypnotist is so strong that a subject with lapses
in his memory' will fill these gaps with details unconsciously con-
fabulated.8 The high susceptibility to suggestion, the need to respond
to questions with what is perceived as the desired answer, and the
tendency to confabulate all work to reduce the factual accuracy of
hypnotically induced testimony.
Apart from these problems, the fatal flaw in the Harding ap-
proach is the misconception that the cross-examination of a previously
hypnotized witness will effectively contest the witness' testimony.2
During cross-examination, most witnesses not subjected to pretrial
hypnosis will communicate uncertainties concerning their recall of an
event. Such uncertainties are manifested by expressions of doubt,
hesitancy in responding to questions and general body language in-
dicating a lack of self-confidence.' These crucial indicators of demeanor
are equal to or greater than the bare substance of a witness' testimony
in forming the foundation on which a jury determines the weight given
such evidence.84
Scientific research indicates that a witness' veracity for his
posthypnotic memory may be so strong at trial that ordinary indicia
of unreliability brought out during cross-examination are erased. 5 A
witness who is uncertain of his recollections prior to hypnosis and
confabulates while hypnotized, will become convinced that his posthyp-
79. Diamond, supra note 9, at 335.
80. Orne, supra note 37, at 321. A currently accepted view in the scientific
community is that no one's conscious or subconscious memory recalls everything in
minute detail. See Note, supra note 10, at 1209. Cf. supra notes 37-39 and accom-
panying text.
81. See supra note 7. The memory a hypnotized subject produces may be a
mosaic of relevant actual facts, irrelevant actual facts taken from an unrelated prior
experience of the subject, fantasized material unconsciously created to fill gaps in the
memory and conscious lies formulated in as realistic fashion as possible. Diamond, supra
note 9, at 335.
82. Ruffra, supra note 65, at 312.
83. Diamond, supra note 9, at 339.
84. Id.
85. Note, supra note 76, at 203. Because a previously hypnotized witness has
an unshakable belief in the veracity of his memory, the ability of counsel to demonstrate
problems with a witness' testimony on cross-examination is substantially limited. See
generally Diamond, supra note 9, at 339-40. The conviction a subject has for the veracity
of his posthypnotic memory is so strong that hypnotic subjects have passed lie detec-
tor tests while attesting to the truth of hypnotically induced falsehoods. Beaver, supra
note 37, at 173.
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notic recollections are accurate.' Consequently, cross-examination loses
effectiveness as a means of attacking the credibility and the accuracy
of the recall.
Given the inherent unreliability of a hypnotically induced memory
and the inability to perform effective cross-examination on a previously
hypnotized witness, a number of courts have expressed doubt about
a jury's ability to assess the credibility of hypnotically induced
testimony. In response, some courts have required that the trial judge
first rule on the admissibility of such testimony. 7 The ruling would
be based on whether or not there was compliance with specified pro-
cedural safeguards designed to remedy the dangers of suggestiveness'
during hypnosis. 9
By focusing on the particular hypnotic procedure used, a judge
could exclude a witness' testimony if he concluded that it was tainted
by the hypnosis and therefore unreliable.' Courts adopting such an
approach recognize the general problems with hypnosis: heightened
suggestibility, the tendency to confabulate, and the inability to effec-
tively cross-examine a previously hypnotized witness.91 However, those
courts also realize that the hypnotically induced testimony may be
relevant evidence. Therefore, by adopting a procedural safeguards ap-
proach, they take a middle-ground between per se admissibility and
per se inadmissibility.
86. See Diamond, supra note 9, at 336 (a subject's belief in his posthypnotic
memory, be it factual or the result of hypnotic fabrication, is prone to "freeze" if the
memory is congruous with the subject's prior beliefs, desires, or prejudices). This is
generally caused by the fact that before and during hypnosis the witness is told that
he will remember everything clearly. Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 105,
436 A.2d 170, 174 (1981) (the court noted that prehypnosis uncertainty becomes molded
under hypnosis into certitude with the subject totally unaware of any suggestions
he acted upon or any confabulation in which he engaged). This solidifying aspect of
hypnosis has prompted one commentator to note that hypnosis may not produce ac-
curate memories, but it does produce consistent ones. Orne, supra note 37, at 333.
87. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (court must
first determine the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony before presenta-
tion to the jury); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 690, 643 P.2d 246, 254 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1981) (trial judge first determines the reliability and therefore the admissibility
of hypnotically induced testimony).
88. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
89. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 91-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v.
Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 689-90, 643 P.2d 246, 253-54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
90. State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 625, 682 P.2d 571, 578 (1984) (in a pretrial
hearing on the procedures used in the particular hypnosis, the trial judge should deter-
mine whether the proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable to merit admission).
91. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 82-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v.
Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 286, 475 N.E.2d 805, 813 (1984).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court was the first to establish pro-
cedural safeguards for the pretrial hypnosis of a witness. In State v.
Hurd," the victim of a stabbing was unable to recall the identity of
her attacker. 3 While under hypnosis the victim identified her ex-
husband as her assailant. Although the victim later expressed doubt
about her identification," she nevertheless gave a statement identify-
ing her ex-husband as her assailant. 6
Before jury selection began, the defense counsel moved up to sup-
press the victim's proposed in-court identification of the defendant
as unreliable." The suppression was granted,' and the issue of whether
a witness' hypnotically induced testimony is admissible in a criminal
trial was appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court." The supreme
court found such testimony admissible in a criminal trial if the trial
judge first determines that the use of hypnosis in each particular case
is reasonably likely to result in recall comparable in accuracy to nor-
mal human memory. ' To provide a record from which the trial judge
could make such a determination, the Hurd court held that future
92. 86 N.J. 525. 432 A.2d 86 (1981). Although Hurd was the first major
decision expressly requiring compliance with court-established safeguards, the approach
was earlier recognized in United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978). The
Adams court applied the credibility approach to the disputed hypnotically induced
testimony, but acknowledged the dangerous potential for abuse accompanying such
evidence. Id. at 198. To protect against the possibility of undue suggestiveness, the
court, in dicta, proposed several safeguards which could be followed during the hyp-
notic procedure. Id. at 199 n.12.
93. Whether the victim was unable or just unwilling to describe her assailant
is not known. Hurd, at 530, 432 A.2d at 88.
94. Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 89. The hypnotized victim identified the defendant
as her attacker only after the investigating officer specifically asked her if it was
"Paul" (the defendant). Id. Dr. Herbert Spiegel, a New York psychiatrist, performed
the hypnosis. Id. at 530, 432 A.2d at 88.
95. Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 89.
96. Id. at 532, 432 A.2d at 89. The investigating officers encouraged the vic-
tim to accept the identification she had made under hypnosis. They advised the victim
that unless she made the identification the defendant would remain free to attack
her again, and possibly leave her children without a mother. They also told her, over
dinner, that if she did not accept the identification, her current husband would remain
a suspect in the case. Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 89.
97. Id. at 532, 432 A.2d at 89.
98. Id. After hearing expert testimony on the reliability of hypnosis as a means
of refreshing recollection and the effect of hypnosis on the victim, the trial court sup-
pressed the proposed identification as unreliable. Hurd v. State, 173 N.J. Super. 333,
414 A.2d 291 (1980).
99. Hurd, at 529, 432 A.2d at 88. The issue was one of first impression for
the court. Id.
100. Id. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92. This analogy poses significant problems. See
infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
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proponents of hypnotically induced testimony must demonstrate com-
pliance with the following six procedural safeguards:'0 ' (1) a psychiatrist
or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis must conduct the
session;'" (2) the professional conducting the session should be indepen-
dent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, investigator,
or the defense; °  (3) any information given the hypnotist by law en-
forcement personnel or the defense prior to the hypnotic session must
be recorded, either in writing or another suitable form; °4 (4) before
inducing hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain from the subject a
detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them;"5
(5) all contacts between the hypnotist and subject must be recorded;0 6
and (6) only the hypnotist and subject should be present during any
phase of the hypnotic session.0 7 Further, the party seeking to admit
the hypnotically induced testimony must establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that all procedures were followed.' 0 The Hurd court
held that the State failed to demonstrate the reliability of the hyp-
notic procedures employed in refreshing the victim's memory.
101. Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97. The procedural safeguards adopted were
based on those suggested by Dr. Martin Orne at the trial court suppression hearing.
Id. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96. The fatal flaw with this approach was later acknowledged
by Dr. Orne. See infra note 122.
102. Hurd, at 545, 432 A.2d at 96. The court recognized that other people are
trained to administer hypnosis, but concluded that a professional should administer
it if the testimony was to be used in a criminal trial. Moreover, the professional should
ideally qualify as an expert in order to aid the court in evaluating the procedures
followed. Further, requiring a professional would enable the court to obtain informa-
tion regarding the pathological reason for the memory loss and the hypnotizability
of the witness. The court also reasoned that an expert would conduct the hypnotic
interrogation in a manner most conducive to yielding accurate recall. Id.
103. Id. This condition safeguards against any bias on the part of the hyp-
notist which may translate into unintentional cues, leading questions, or any other
suggestive conduct. Id.
104. Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 96. This requirement aids the court in determining
the extent of information the hypnotist could have communicated to the witness either
directly or through suggestion. Id.
105. Id. The court cautioned the hypnotist against influencing the subject's
description of facts. Id.
106. Id. Such establishes a record of the pre-induction interview, the hypnotic
session, and the posthypnotic period, which subsequently enables a court to deter-
mine what suggestions or information were received by the witness and what recall
hypnosis first elicited. The court encouraged the use of a video recorder, but did not
make it mandatory. Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97.
107. Id. The court recognized that it may be easier for a person familiar with
the investigation to conduct at least part of the questioning, but the risk of inadver-
tent suggestions to the subject outweighed any benefits. Id.
108. Id.
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Therefore, the lower court's suppression of the proposed in-court iden-
tification was upheld. °9
Six courts have subsequently adopted the procedural safeguards
approach."' Although this approach avoids the difficulty in having
jurors initially assess the accuracy of the hypnotically induced
testimony,"' it nonetheless has a number of flaws. One such flaw lies
in the comparison" 2 of hypnotically induced memory to the often in-
accurate normal eyewitness memory."' The Hurd court and its progeny
realize that hypnosis may not induce a factually accurate memory,
yet they reason that if hypnosis can induce memory as accurate as
normal eyewitness memory, testimony from the hypnotically induced
memory should be equally admissible."' This reasoning has been
criticized for its failure to recognize that hypnotically induced memory
is unlike ordinary eyewitness memory. '
By its very nature hypnotically induced memory is unlike ordi-
nary eyewitness memory. Most obvious is the fact that hypnosis is
employed only when a person is unable to recall facts which could
not be remembered through ordinary recall."' Further, the hypnotic
subject is much more vulnerable to suggestion than the normal person,
and the resulting hypnotic distortions persist with greater force into
the posthypnotic period."7 Although the law does not generally ex-
109. Id. at 548, 432 A.2d at 98. The court determined that the procedures out-
lined were not even close to being followed. Further, the court disapproved of the
detective in the case questioning the subject during the hypnotic session. Id. at 548-49,
432 A.2d at 98. See supra note 94.
110. See supra note 13. Oregon has even codified the procedural safeguards
approach. OR. REV. STAT. S 136.675 (1983).
111. Note, supra note 10, at 1219.
112. The Hurd court held that testimony enhanced through hypnosis is ad-
missible in a criminal trial if the trial court finds that the use of hypnosis was reasonably
likely to produce recall comparable in accuracy to normal human memory. Hurd at
543, 432 A.2d at 95.
113. Research demonstrates that conventional eyewitness testimony is fraught
with inaccuracy and distortion. See generally Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN L.
REV. 969 (1977).
114. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 543, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (1981); State v. Weston,
16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 286-87, 475 N.E.2d 805, 813 (1984).
115. State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 217, 313 N.W.2d 648, 654 (1981) (to com-
pare the "recollections" of a witness whose testimony has been hypnotically induced
to the "recollections" of an ordinary witness, and then determine whether the use
of hypnosis was a reliable means of restoring memory comparable in accuracy to nor-
mal recall, is virtually impossible).
116. State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 727, 684 P.2d 651, 658-59 (1984).
117. Diamond, supra note 9, at 342.
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elude normal eyewitness testimony for being somewhat distorted or
inaccurate,118 such does not justify the admission of testimony which
is known to have been subject to distortion,"9 such as hypnotically
induced testimony." Therefore, analogizing hypnotically induced testi-
mony to ordinary eyewitness testimony only sidesteps the problem.2 '
A further flaw of the safeguards approach is its inability to pre-
vent a hypnotized subject from confusing hypnotic confabulation with
factual memory. 2 ' Experts agree that neither the person hypnotized,
the hypnotist, nor hypnosis experts are capable of distinguishing a
hypnotized subject's factual recall from hypnotically confabulated
recall." Therefore, even if procedural safeguards are followed, requir-
ing a trial judge to initially determine the factual reliability of hyp-
notically induced testimony is an unrealistic expectation."'
Under both the credibility approach and the safeguards approach
the possibility exists for hypnotically induced testimony being admit-
ted at trial. A third position taken by courts is the per se exclusion
of.all hypnotically induced testimony. Courts adopting the rule of per
se exclusion possess a concern for the present state of the art of hyp-
nosis. Accordingly, they rely on the common law Frye standard of
general scientific acceptance as the standard against which hypnosis
must be measured in determining the admissibility of its product: hyp-
notically induced testimony.2 '
118. See generally Note, supra note 113. Quite often people claim to see things
which did not happen, and fail to see things which did. Diamond, supra note 9, at 341-42.
119. Diamond, supra note 9, at 342 (this legal attitude is analogous to the
claim that we should not even attempt to eliminate the disease of smallpox because
chickenpox is so common and cannot be controlled) Id.
120. See supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text.
121. State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 727-28, 684 P.2d 651, 658 (1984).
122. Dr. Orne, the scientist who initially proposed the use of procedural
safeguards, supra note 101, subsequently acknowledged that fact that the safeguards
cannot prevent a subject from confusing that which he has confabulated under hyp-
nosis with actual previous memory. Ruffra, supra note 65, at 315 (quoting from Orne,
Affidavit for Amicus Curiae Brief in Opposition to Petition for Rehearing Before California
Supreme Court, at 15-16).
123. Diamond, supra note 9, at 337 (no one, regardless of experience can verify
the accuracy of hypnotically induced memory). If the hypnotically induced recall is
illogical, incoherent, and incompatible with known facts, one can, with a high degree
of certainty, consider it fantasy. Id. It has been suggested that if a subject's hyp-
notically induced testimony is corroborated, its factual accuracy may be ascertained.
United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 282 n.11 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (if a subject
under hypnosis states a fact which is later found to be true, the probability that the
recall is reliable is increased).
124. See generally Diamond, supra note 9, at 336-38.
125. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 54, 641 P.2d 775, 796, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
265 (1982) (hypnosis does not satisfy the Frye test of admissibility); State v. Martin,
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 [1986], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol20/iss3/7
19861 HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED TESTIMONY
The Frye standard of admissibility for scientific evidence' 6
originated in Frye v. United States.'" The issue before the Frye court
concerned the standard for determining the admissibility of evidence
derived from a novel scientific technique.'28 Frye was a murder pros-
ecution case in which the trial court rejected the defendant's attempt
to introduce an expert's testimony on the results of a "systolic blood
pressure test," a predecessor of the polygraph.'" The Frye court held
that expert testimony based on the results of a novel scientific tech-
nique or procedure is admissible when that technique has gained a
general acceptance in the appropriate scientific community for pro-
ducing reliable results.1 31 In effect, the Frye court assigned the task
of determining the reliability of an evolving scientific technique to
members of the scientific community from which the method emerges
rather than to the trial judge.'31 In applying this new standard, the
Frye court held that an expert witness could not testify as to the
results of the polygraph test, because the test was not generally ac-
cepted in the scientific community as producing reliable results.' 2
Subsequently, the Frye standard became the dominant standard for
determining the admissibility of expert testimony based upon a scien-
tific technique.'33
101 Wash. 2d 713, 724, 684 P.2d 651, 657 (1984) (hypnosis in its current state fails
to satisfy the Frye standard).
126. Traditionally an expert witness may testify if his testimony is relevant
and helpful to the trier of facts. However, when an expert witness is to testify about
scientific tests or findings, many courts apply a special rule of admissibility. See generally
Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV.
313 (1962-64); Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970
U. ILL. L.F. 1.
127. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye case was one of first impression.
McCormick, Deception-Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 484, 499
(1926-27).
128. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1014.
131. This conservative posture has been viewed as the primary advantage of
the Frye standard. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245-46, 129
Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1976) (Frye deliberately interposes a substantial obstacle to the
unrestricted admission of evidence based on scientific principles, this is logically sound).
One court analogized the initial scientific acceptance as a technical jury passing upon
the status of an evolving scientific procedure. People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 405,
255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (1977).
132. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
133. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 382, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978) (the Frye stan-
dard of general acceptance is the standard in almost all courts considering the ques-
tion of the admissibility of scientific evidence). See State ex. rel. Collins v. Superior
Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 196, 644 P.2d 1266, 1282 (1982) (Frye is the leading standard
in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence).
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In 1980, the Frye standard was judicially adopted in determining
the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony. In State v. Mack,13
the victim of a criminal sexual assault was hypnotized in an effort
to restore her memory of the attack.1" While under hypnosis the victim
recalled and related to the hypnotist the attack, the identity of her
attacker, and the manner in which she had been attacked. 3 ' The hyp-
notist gave the subject a posthypnotic suggestion that upon awakening
from the trance she would remember everything she had told him.137
Upon awakening from the trance the victim remembered who had at-
tacked her and how."' She subsequently testified to this in court.
The defense counsel in Mack asserted that the scientific tech-
nique of hypnosis was not generally accepted by the scientific com-
munity as producing reliable recall, and it therefore, failed the Frye
test. Consequently, the victim's hypnotically induced testimony should
be ruled inadmissible as evidence. 139 The court agreed that hypnosis
must first satisfy the Frye test before admitting hypnotically induc-
ed testimony. 4 ' In determining the accuracy of the defense's asser-
tion, the Mack court considered scientific literature on hypnosis as
well as testimony by five experts in the field.' The court then con-
cluded that hypnosis was not generally accepted in the scientific com-
134. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980). The question certified to the Minnesota
Supreme Court concerned the use of hypnotically induced testimony in a criminal trial.
Id. at 765.
135. Id. at 767. The victim entered the hospital bleeding from a deep cut in
her vaginal wall. The victim told one intern the cut had been sustained while having
sexual intercourse with the defendant; she then told another intern that the cut was
the result of being in a motorcycle accident with the defendant. The doctors informed
the victim they believed neither story. Subsequently, the victim telephoned the police
and reported being assaulted. However, she also told police she could not remember
the incident. Id. at 766.
136. Id. at 767. Under hypnosis the victim recalled the defendant sticking a
knife in her vagina numerous times. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 767.
140. Id. at 768. The court recognized that hypnotically-adduced memory is not
strictly analogous to the results of mechanical testing; however, the court felt that
Frye is equally applicable where the best expert testimony indicates that no expert
can determine whether hypnotically induced memory is factually accurate or the result
of hypnotic confabulation. Id.
141. Id. at 765-66. There are three types of proof which can be used by a court
in determining whether there is a general scientific acceptance of a scientific procedure:
(1) expert testimony, (2) scientific and legal literature, and (3) judicial opinions. Giannelli,
supra note 19, at 1215. For a discussion of the problems present in each type of proof,
see id. at 1215-19.
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munity as a means of producing reliable recall,"4 2 and therefore, failed
to satisfy the Frye test of admissibility. The court explained that the
scientific community's failure to generally accept hypnosis as a means
of producing reliable recall was based on the problems of a hypnotized
subject's heightened suggestibility, and a subject's tendency to con-
fabulate."' The court was also concerned with the fact that cross-
examination of a previously hypnotized witness is neutralized by
pretrial hypnosis.44 These findings led the Mack court to conclude that
the fairest practice was to keep all hypnotically induced testimony
out of judicial proceedings. 4 '
The Mack court approach has not been above reproach. The fact
that a state must choose between using a particular witness at trial
or using hypnosis on that witness as a investigative tool has been
the target of criticism.4 6 If a witness is hypnotized in an effort to
refresh his memory of the facts surrounding a crime, these facts may
prove vital to solving the crime. 7 However, under the inadmissibility
approach, the facts recalled under hypnosis and all memory naturally
regained after hypnosis are inadmissible as evidence. Requiring a state
to choose between using a person as an investigative tool or as a
witness at trial exacts too high a price.14' If hypnosis is not employed
the crime may go unsolved; likewise, if hypnosis is employed and in-
admissible hypnotically induced testimony constitutes the bulwark of
the prosecutor's case, insufficient evidence may preclude the trying
of the crime.
The major criticism levied at the Mack court approach is the
contention that the Frye standard is inapplicable in determining the
admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony.'49 The issue before the
Frye court concerned the admissibility of expert opinion on scientifical-
ly obtained data.1" Specifically, the Frye court was to determine
whether an expert could testify as to the results of a polygraph test
administered to the defendant.' The expert's testimony was to go
142. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 768-69.
145. Id. at 772.
146. People v. Gibson, 117 Ill. App. 3d 270, 276, 452 N.E.2d 1368, 1373 (1983)
(requiring a state to choose between using hypnosis on a witness to aid in the resolu-
tion of a difficult case and using that witness at trial exacts too high a price).
147. See supra note 6.
i-). People v. Gibson, 117 Il. App. 3d 270, 276, 452 N.E.2d 1368, 1373 (1983).
149. See supra note 17.
150. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
151. Id.
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to the truth or falsity of what the defendant had stated while taking
a lie detector test." In contrast, a witness testifying from a hypnotical-
ly induced memory testifies from his present memory of what he
previously observed, and not to the results of a scientific procedure."
The Frye standard is concerned with the admission of expert opinion
deduced from the results of a scientific technique; it is not concerned
with the admission of eyewitness testimony. Therefore, Frye is inap-
plicable in determining the admissibility of hypnotically induced
testimony."
A Federal court has yet to adopt the Frye standard for deter-
mining the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony. Since United
States v. Narciso,'" federal courts have almost uniformly found hyp-
notically induced testimony admissible, with the fact of hypnosis going
to the witness' credibility.
In Narciso, two nurses were convicted of certain offenses arising
from induced cardiopulmonary arrests of patients at a veterans
hospital.' A patient who had experienced such an arrest was unable
to recall who had been at his bedside prior to the incident. 57 Twice
the patient was hypnotized in an effort to refresh his memory."
Twenty-three days after the second hypnosis session the patient an-
nounced that he remembered who had been at his bed the night of
his heart attack.59 The patient subsequently identified one of the defen-
dants from photographs.' After hearing expert testimony on hyp-
nosis and viewing videotapes of the hypnotic sessions, 6' the court con-
cluded that the testimony of the previously hypnotized patient was
admissible, with its credibility to be determined by the jury.6 '
Having adopted the credibility approach towards hypnotically in-
duced testimony, it is unlikely that the federal courts will relinquish
it in favor of the Frye approach. There are two reasons for asserting
such. First, an issue currently in dispute is whether the Federal Rules of
152. Id.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
154. See supra note 17.
155. 466 F. Supp 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
156. Id. at 262-63.
157. Id. at 277.
158. Id. at 277-78. While under hypnosis he vaguely described two individuals
he believed were at his bedside, but he made no identifications. Id. at 277-78.
159. Id. at 278.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 280-81.
162. Id. at 284. The court stated that the witness' testimony was not so im-
plausible that it could not be true; therefore, the jury is to determine the credibility
of the witness and the weight of the testimony. Id.
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Evidence even have a Frye standard to apply." 3 The Federal Rules
do not explicitly distinguish between scientific expert testimony and
other forms of expert testimony.-"4 The Federal Rules permit experts
to rely on facts or data not otherwise admissible into evidence as long
as they are "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field." ' "Reasonable reliance" is not synonymous with the Frye test
notion of "general acceptance."'" Therefore, even though not expressly
revoked by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the common law Frye stan-
dard may no longer be a viable option for the federal courts. Second,
even if the Frye standard still exists, one federal court has indicated
that Frye is only appropriate for determining the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony, and not the testimony of one who testifies from a
hypnotically induced memory.' In short, because a number of federal
and state courts alike will not make a per se exclusion of hypnotically
induced testimony on the basis of the Frye test, another rationale
which justifies a per se exclusion is necessary.
An alternative rationale for the exclusion of hypnotically induced
testimony is the rationale underlying the exclusion of hearsay. Hear-
say fails to satisfy three testimonial requirements and therefore, is
generally excluded from trial as unreliable. Hypnotically induced
testimony similarly fails to satisfy these same requirements and should
likewise be deemed unreliable and inadmissible in all judicial pro-
ceedings. To understand this, a closer look at the hearsay exclusion
rationale is imperative.
III. THE PROBLEMS UNDERLYING A WITNESS TESTIFYING
FROM A HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED MEMORY
ARE THE SAME PROBLEMS
UNDERLYING HEARSAY TESTIMONY
"Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
163. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
164. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 reads:
Bases of Opinion Testimony by Expert:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him
at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,
the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
165. Id.
166. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, S 203 at 607.
167. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1984) (Frye test
inapplicable in determining the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony).
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the truth of the matter asserted."'' 8 This definition of hearsay is in
effect in all federal courts, and is generally consistent with the views
expressed in common law jurisdictions.'69 The hearsay rule is quite
simple: hearsay is generally not admissible at trial. ' Such is due to
its unreliability.'7 1 This lack of reliability is the result of one or more
of the three testimonial requirements not being satisfied. A witness
should testify under oath or affirmation, in the presence of the trier
of fact, and be subject to contemporaneous cross-examination.' These
requirements encourage witnesses to put forth their best efforts when
testifying and to expose any inaccuracies or lies.17a Testimony which does
not satisfy these requirements may be objected to as hearsay.' Although
168. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, S 246 at 729.
See generally, Weinstein, Probative Forces of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 331-34
(1960-61). John Wigmore, noted evidence scholar, classifies the hearsay rule as an analytic
rule. "[A] rule which accomplishes the desired aim by subjecting the offered evidence
to a scrutiny or analysis calculated to discover and expose in detail its possible
weaknesses, and thus to enable the tribunal to estimate it at no more than its actual
value." 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 1360 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
169. For a review of the state provisions, see 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I 801(a)-(c)[02]. No state provision varies significantly from the
federal version.
170. FED. R. EVID. 802 provides: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provid-
ed by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority or by act of Congress." The Federal Rules of Evidence lists twenty-
four hearsay exceptions when availability of declarant as a witness is immaterial. See
FED. R. EVID. 803. The Federal Rules of Evidence also lists five hearsay exceptions
when declarant is unavailable as a witness. See FED. R. EVID. 804. See Nokes, The
English Jury and the Law of Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REV. 153, 167 (1956) (although near-
ly one-third of evidence law is concerned with hearsay problems, most commentators
discuss the exceptions, not the rule).
171. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (the Supreme Court
noted that the hearsay rule "is based on experience and grounded in the notion that
untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to the triers of fact"); Donnelly v.
United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913) (the Supreme Court commented that hearsay
evidence is an unsafe reliance in a court of justice).
172. D. BINDER, THE HEARSAY HANDBOOK 5 (1975). See generally J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 169, at 800[01], C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at S 245.
173. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, S 245. (the three testimonial requirements
evolved through the Anglo-American tradition). To assure compliance with the
testimonial requirements, the rule against hearsay was developed. Id. See generally
Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV.
484 (1936-37).
174. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, S 245. The hearsay objection, like all other
exclusionary objections, must be made at the time the objectionable evidence is of-
fered or else the right to object is waived. Id. at S 52. See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers
and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 183 (1948-49) ("To-
day the notion that the court and jury cannot be permitted to rely upon the possible
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a witness testifying from a hypnotically induced memory does so under
oath or affirmation, in the presence of the trier of fact, and is subject
to contemporaneous cross-examination, the rationale and goal underly-
ing each requirement remains unsatisfied.
A. The Oath or Affirmation
Requiring a witness to testify under oath or affirmation " is
to awaken the conscience of the witness and impress upon him his
duty to testify truthfully. " ' This purpose is accomplished by summon-
ing possible religious and legal retribution against the witness who
testifies falsely.'77 Religiously the oath calls the witness' attention to
God in hopes of instilling in him a fear of Divine punishment for testi-
fying falsely. '78 In this manner the oath operates by setting against
the witness' motive to testify falsely the fear of Divine punishment. "9
Legally the oath attempts to impress upon the witness the need to
credibility of the witness seems to have gone by the board, for unless the adversary
objects, the court may admit inadmissible hearsay and the trier of fact may give it
such value as is within the bounds of reasons.").
175. Wigmore classifies the oath a s prophylactic rule, for it operates by ap-
plying to the evidence prior to its admission. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 1813 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1976).
176. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, S 245.
177. Id.
178. Id. The supposed mental process is best exemplified in the exhortation
by the judge in Lady Lisle's Trial, 11 How. St. Tr. 298, 325 (1685) (quoted in J.
WIGMORE, supra note 175, S 1816):
Now mark what I say to you, friend .... Thou hast a precious immortal
soul, and there is nothing in the world equal to it in value .... Consider
that the Great God of Heaven and Earth, before whose tribunal thou and
we and all persons are to stand at the last day, will call thee to an ac-
count for the rescinding his truth, and take vengeance of thee for every
falsehood thou tellest. I charge thee, therefore, as thou will answer it
to the Great God, the judge of all the earth, that thou do not dare to
waver one tittle from the truth, upon any account or pretence whatsoever;
• . . for that God of Heaven may justly strike thee into eternal flames
and make thee drop into the bottomless lake of fire and brimstone, if
thou offer to deviate the least from the truth and nothing but the truth.
In the ancient manner, after the oath was administered, testimony given, and the witness
left standing unharmed, the court knew the divine judgment had pronounced the witness
to be a speaker of truth. J. WIGMORE, supra note 175, S 1816.
179. Id. at S 1813. Today the theological underpinnings of the oath require-
ment have been diminished through statutory provisions for affirmation and by holding
that religious belief is a non-essential prerequisite to be bound by an oath, see Flores
v. State, 443 P.2d 73, 77 (Alaska 1968). As Professor Morgan writes: "The deliberate
expression by a witness of his purpose to tell the truth by a method which is binding
upon his conscience probably still operates as some stimulus to tell the truth; but
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testify truthfully or be subjected to criminal punishment for perjury,"
of which an oath or affirmation is a prerequisite. 8' The perjury penalty
substitutes the fear of temporal punishment for that of Divine punish-
ment. Both the religious and legal penalties associated with the oath
operate to subjectively influence the witness against testifying falsely.
However, requiring a witness to take an oath or affirmation prior
to testifying from a hypnotically induced memory fails to subjectively
influence a witness against testifying falsely. As demonstrated earlier,
a witness after undergoing hypnosis is unable to distinguish memory
of actual facts from the detail filled in through confabulation.'82
Therefore, a previously hypnotized witness may objectively be viewed
as violating the sanctity of the oath and committing perjury when
testifying to possible hypnotically induced falsehoods; yet subjective-
ly the witness is not violating the oath nor committing perjury,
because he believes that such hypnotically induced falsehood is fac-
tual and that he is not testifying falsely." In effect, pretrial hypnosis
circumvents both the function and purpose for requiring a witness
to testify under oath. Therefore, the purpose for requiring a witness
to testify under oath is not satisfied when a witness testifies from
a hypnotically induced memory. Likewise, the dual purpose underlying -
the testimonial requirement of personal presence remains unsatisfied
when a witness testifies from a hypnotically induced memory.
B. Personal Presence
One reason for requiring a witness' personal presence when testi-
fying is to impress upon him the solemnity of the occasion.'" By re-
quiring a witness to testify in a courtroom and in the immediate
presence of the person against whom he is testifying, the witness will
be more inclined to tell the truth.85 Although this requirement may
induce a previously hypnotized witness to testify truthfully, there is
fear of punishment by supernatural forces for violation of an oath is generally regarded
as virtually nonexistent. Morgan, supra note 174, at 186.
180. "Perjury is a false oath in a judicial proceeding in regard to a material
matter. A false oath is a wilfull and corrupt sworn statement made without sincere
belief in its truthfulness." R. PERKINS, & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 511 (3d ed. 1982).
181. Id. at 512-13.
182. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
184. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, S 245.
185. Id. See D. BINDER, supra note 172, at 5 ("[Fialsehood may be discouraged
by the judicial atmosphere of the courtroom, or by the fact that the witness must
testify in the presence of the party against whom his testimony offends."); J. WEIN-
STEIN, supra note 169, at 800[01] ("The requirement of personal presence also un-
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one caveat: a previously hypnotized witness is unable to distinguish
his factually restored memory from hypnotically fabricated memory.
As previously demonstrated, a person who has had his memory hyp-
notically induced believes that all of his memory is factual.'87 Even
though the solemnity of the occasion may prompt a previously hyp-
notized witness to subjectively wish to testify truthfully, such will
not deter him from testifying to a possible falsehood he subjectively
believes to be true. Therefore, the first of two reasons for requiring
a witness to be personally present when testifying is neutralized by
a witness who undergoes pretrial hypnosis.
To enable the trier of fact to determine the witness' credibility
is the second reason for requiring a witness' personal presence when
testifying.'88 As discussed previously, a witness' credibility is deter-
mined by giving the trier of fact the opportunity to observe and con-
sider the demeanor of the witness. 8 ' Most witnesses aware of defi-
ciencies or fabrications in their recall of an event will subtly com-
municate this awareness while testifying, by showing signs of doubt,
hesitancy, voice intonations, and unconscious gestures. Pretrial hyp-
nosis eliminates this deficiency awareness. Hypnosis strengthens a
witness' confidence in the veracity of his recall, regardless of whether
the recall is factual or hypnotically fabricated. 9 ' Doubts and uncer-
tainties concerning the memory of the hypnotically induced event are
resolved as factually accurate.8 2 Therefore, observing a witness for
signs of uncertainty concerning the factual accuracy of his hypnotically
induced testimony would be to no avail, since the witness subjective-
ly believes his entire hypnotically induced memory is factual. Such
doubtedly makes it more difficult to lie against someone, particularly if that person
is an accused and present at trial.").
186. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
188. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, S 245. See also Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (a witness should be required "to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief."),
quoted with approval, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
189. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. See generally Sahm, Demeanor
Evidence: Elusive and Intangible Imponderables, 47 A.B.A.J. 580 (1961).
190. Diamond, supra note 9, at 339. See D. BINDER, supra note 172, at 5 (a ner-
vous manner, a shifting of the eyes, a friendly or hostile attitude, all play a role in
determining a witness' credibility).
191. Diamond, supra note 9, at 340 (the hypnosis may not add any substantive
facts to the witness' memory which would even justify the increased confidence). See
supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
192. Diamond, supra note 9, at 339-40; see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying
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completely undermines the fact finder's ability to judge the witness'
credibility. Therefore, not one but both reasons for requiring a witness
to testify in the presence of the trier of fact remain unsatisfied.
Similarly, the purpose behind the third testimonial requirement of con-
temporaneous cross-examination remains unsatisfied when a witness
testifies from a posthypnotic memory.
C. Cross-Examination
To expose inaccuracies in a witness' testimony is the purpose
underlying the testimonial requirement of contemporaneous cross-
examination. A fact finder relying on a witness' testimony need make
four assumptions: (1) that the witness accurately perceived the matter
he is describing, (2) that the witness retained an accurate memory
of this perception, (3) that the fact finder's understanding of the
witness' spoken words is the understanding the witness intends to
convey, and (4) that the witness is sincere in the belief of his story.19 3
The probing of these four factors on cross-examination reduces the
risk that the fact finder will reach an invalid conclusion from the
witness' testimony." However, due to the components of the hypnoti-
cally induced memory, this is not always true.
The hypnotically induced memory is generally a collection of ap-
propriate actual facts, irrelevant actual facts, fantasy, and any details
necessary to make the memory logically and factually cohesive.1 95 A
witness' original perception and memory of an event becomes just
a part of the hypnotically induced memory. Which part it becomes
is not known.' Therefore, because hypnosis fills in memory lapses
with indistinguishable fantasized materials,'97 faults in a witness'
perception and memory of an event cannot be exposed through cross-
examination. Consequently, probing the witness' narrative skills can
accomplish two results: it can ensure that the fact finder correctly
understands the actual fact which the witness relates or that the fact
193. Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682, 684-85 (1961-62). See C. MCCORMICK, supra note
16, S 245 (McCormick combines narration and sincerity, resulting in three factors rather
than four). See also J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 169, at 800[01J.
194. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at S 19 (the purpose of cross-examination is
to ensure that the fact finder will not be misled into mistaking the false for the true).
See also J. WIGMORE, supra note 168, at S 1367. (Wigmore characterizes cross-examination
as "beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
the truth.").
195. See supra note 81.
196. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 81.
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finder correctly understands the hypnotically fantasized memory which
the witness relates as fact. Moreover, probing the previously hyp-
notized witness' sincerity will expose no shortcomings since such a
witness is subjectively unable to distinguish hypnotically induced facts
from hypnotic fantasy, resulting in the belief that all posthypnotic
memory is factually accurate.'98 Hence, a witness' confidence in the
veracity of his posthypnotic memory increases and may be unshakeable
during cross-examination.' " Consequently, a previously hypnotized
witness may be as sincere and confident in testifying to hypnotically
induced falsehoods as he is in testifying to the factual truth. Therefore,
due to the inability to expose error or inconsistency in a previously
hypnotized witness' perception, memory, or sincerity through cross-
examination, cross-examination is for all practical purposes rendered
ineffective and its purpose remains unsatisfied when a witness testifies
from a hypnotically induced memory.
As demonstrated, the testimonial requirements of an oath or af-
firmation, personal presence, and contemporaneous cross-examination
remain unsatisfied when a witness testifies from a hypnotically in-
duced memory. Hearsay is generally excluded from evidence as
unreliable because it fails to satisfy any one of these same testimonial
requirements. Because a witness testifying from a hypnotically induc-
ed memory fails to satisfy all three testimonial requirements, hyp-
notically induced testimony should likewise be excluded from evidence
as unreliable.
However, unlike the hearsay rule which is riddled with excep-
tions,"°° hypnotically induced testimony should be excluded on a per
se basis. Exceptions to hearsay arise when there is a necessity for
the hearsay and the situation in which the hearsay was uttered makes
it trustworthy."°1 Hypnotically induced testimony may be necessary,
but it can never be trustworthy due to the three previously discussed
factors inherent in hypnosis which work to negate its factual ac-
curacy. 2 Therefore, hypnotically induced testimony should be per se
excluded from trial.
If a court chooses to exclude hypnotically induced testimony on
the hearsay rationale, this does not mean that such testimony could
198. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
199. Id.
200. See supra note 170.
201. J. WIGMORE, supra note 168, at SS 1421-22 (Wigmore lables the two re-
quirements for a hearsay exception as "necessity" and "circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness"). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at S 253.
202. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
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still be excluded on this basis if and when hypnosis someday satisfies
the Frye standard of admissibility. If hypnosis is someday generally
accepted as a means of producing reliable recall, the factual hypnotical-
ly induced memory must necessarily be distinguishable from that
memory hypnotically confabulated. When the problems caused by the
inability to distinguish between these two aspects of a posthypnotic
memory are gone, the purpose underlying the three testimonial re-
quirements may be satisfied,"3 for the central problem a previously
hypnotized witness has in satisfying the testimonial requirements is
caused by the subjective and objective inability to distinguish factual
recall from hypnotically confabulated recall!0 Therefore, if hypnosis
someday passes the Frye standard and hypnotically induced testimony
is found admissible, excluding hypnotically induced testimony on a
rationale analogous to the hearsay rule will no longer be a viable
option.
CONCLUSION
The reliability, or rather the unreliability, of hypnotically induced
testimony is a current problem in the courts. As demonstrated, the
confusion in the scientific world surrounding the phenomenon of hyp-
nosis has led to equal confusion in court's determining the admissibility
of hypnotically induced testimony. Critically analyzed, the three dif-
ferent admissibility positions taken by courts concerning hypnotically
induced testimony are: the credibility approach which generally allows
such testimony into evidence, the procedural safeguards approach
which admits such testimony if stipulated safeguards are first complied
with, and the per se inadmissibility approach, which usually excludes
such testimony on the basis of the Frye test.
Note was taken of the fact that some courts feel the Frye test
is an inappropriate standard against which to judge the admissibility
of hypnotically induced testimony. It was also noted that the federal
courts may, in fact, no longer have a Frye test to apply. An alter-
native rationale for the per se exclusion of hypnotically induced
testimony was therefore proposed. The proposed rationale is the same
rationale underlying the hearsay rule. How a witness testifying from
a hypnotically induced memory fails to satisfy the purpose underlying
the testimonial requirements of an oath or affirmation, personal
presence, and contemporaneous cross-examination were discussed. The
conclusion was drawn that because the hearsay rule is to assure com-
203. See generally supra notes 175-99 and accompanying text.
204. Id.
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pliance with the three testimonial requirements, and a witness testi-
fying from a posthypnotic memory fails to satisfy these requirements,
hypnotically induced testimony must necessarily be excluded on the
hearsay rationale.
Serious problems require serious solutions. The reliability of hyp-
notically induced testimony is a serious problem. Courts allowing such
testimony into evidence do not know whether the testimony is fac-
tual or whether it is the product of hypnotic confabulation. In fact,
nobody knows. Therefore, until a way is discovered in which this
distinction can be made, courts which do not presently exclude hyp-
notically induced testimony on the basis of Frye, should now per se
exclude it on the hearsay rationale.
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